This article seeks to elucidate the historical basis in UK company law of the right for one company to be a member (i.e. shareholder) of another company and, through this position, benefit from limited liability. The contemporary relevance of this study lies in better understanding the original rationale behind conferring limited liability upon corporate members. Their own members may have already benefited from it. The protection afforded by this doctrine can, of course, be used strategically by a parent company to minimise losses arising from its subsidiary's activities. It is argued that the courts found corporate membership to be compatible with the Companies Act 1862 in the late 1860s to ensure that the companies in question bore legal responsibility for shares which they held or were held on their behalf. This prevented them from disclaiming liabilities associated with the shares by contending that their very ownership was, in fact, unlawful. Importantly, the courts neither
A. INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century, it has been common in the United Kingdom for enterprise to be conducted through a number of legally distinct companies, together comprising a single corporate group. 1 The complexity of the legal structures adopted by many enterprises has increased exponentially with time. From the early days of rudimentary parent-subsidiary relationships, there may be many tiers of parent, subsidiary and sub-subsidiary companies within a modern corporate group. Whilst genuine managerial and administrative efficiencies may be attained through the adoption of such structures, 2 their employment may be more contrived. In recent years, the convoluted and, at times, artificial manner in which some multinational enterprises operating within the UK are structured so as to reduce their liability for corporation tax has come under close scrutiny by the UK Government. Company 9 would deem this to be compatible with the Act in 1867. It did so by finding that a limited company was a 'person' for the purposes of the Act and so capable of being a 'member' of another limited company if, and only if, this was authorised by its constitution.
This approach was followed one year later in In re Asiatic Banking Corporation.
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Through enabling one company to be a member of another, the decisions in Barned's and Asiatic Banking would transform the way in which enterprise in the UK was conducted.
Their impact was, however, amplified by two later developments. The first was the trend towards the small, fully paid up share, a movement not envisaged by the originators of limited liability. 11 These became common in the 1870s and 1880s, with the £1 share prevalent 'in almost every sphere of limited company enterprise' by the end of the century.
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It was at this point that limited liability became truly effective in reducing the risk to which members were exposed by the company's insolvency. Prior to the emergence of this trend, large calls made in respect of unpaid portions of issued shares could, and often did, result in financial ruin for those involved even though they benefited from limited liability. 13 The second development was the confirmation that a subsidiary possessed a legal personality separate to its parent. This was emphasised first by the High Court in the 1893 decision of where one member held virtually all of its shares. 17 Whilst Salomon concerned a family-run business and was decided when corporate groups were relatively rare, its ratio was extended to parent-subsidiary relationships from the early twentieth century. 18 Thus, through piecemeal development, UK company law evolved so as to enable the creation of corporate structures capable of insulating each tier entirely from the debts and obligations of the lower tiers and, indeed, those of other group companies.
The separate legal personality of incorporated companies and the limited liability of their members have spawned an extensive body of literature. There has, however, been very little analysis of the origins in UK company law of the right for one company to be a member of another company. Writing over a century apart, Blumberg 19 and Brice 20 did consider the significance of the decisions in Barned's and Asiatic Banking but they drew opposing conclusions on the authority for which the cases stood. 21 Contradictions aside, neither Brice or Blumberg, nor any other commentator who has cited Barned's and Asiatic exercised by the English company is exercised by it as the holder of practically all the shares in the American company...The business of a company is not carried on by its shareholders, but by the company through its directors...': ibid 516 (emphasis added Phillip Blumberg, 'Limited Liability and Corporate Groups' (1986) 11 J Corp Law 573, 608-609. 20 Seward Brice, A Treatise on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires: being an investigation of the principles which limit the capacities, powers, and liabilities of corporations, and more especially of joint stock companies (Stevens & Haynes 1874) 92-96. 21 For Brice, a company possessed an implied power to be a member of another company which did not need to be provided for expressly: ibid 93. In contrast, Blumberg asserted that silence in the memorandum of association, a core constitutional document of the company, meant that the purchase of another company's shares was ultra vires: Blumberg (n 19) 608.
Banking as authority for the lawfulness of corporate membership, 22 has attempted to explain the legal factors that led the courts to construct the 1862 Act in a manner permissive of corporate membership. There has been even less consideration in the literature of the closely connected question as to whether an intended corollary of the right of corporate membership, as originally conceived, was the conferral of limited liability to corporate members. Blumberg is the exception here. He made the significant, yet undeveloped observation that this question had, largely, 23 been ignored by the English courts but did not attempt to explain this. 24 This article contributes to the literature in two ways: first, it elucidates the legal factors that shaped the emergence of a right of corporate membership;
and, secondly, it considers whether the conferral of limited liability to corporate members was an intended consequence of this right.
The contemporary relevance of this study lies in better understanding both the historical legal basis and original rationale behind conferring limited liability upon corporate members. Their own members may, of course, have already benefited from it. The doctrine of limited liability has been treated as near inviolable in parent-subsidiary relationships by the UK courts. In the absence of wording in a particular statute or contract permitting shareholders to be held liable for the company's debts, the courts have, typically, refused to hold a parent company liable for the debts of its subsidiary. 25 It seems likely that this position will be maintained even where a subsidiary has been used strategically to insulate the parent 
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One important implication of the court's approach is that it encourages entrepreneurial risk-taking. 27 In the absence of limited liability, decision-makers within an enterprise considering entering in to a new venture may be discouraged by the fear of placing the assets of the wider group at risk should it fail. By affirming the parent's unilaterally determined limitation on its liability (i.e. by limiting its liability to any unpaid share capital), the position of the court provides certainty and predictability. 28 These are highly regarded values in corporate planning and decision-making.
More controversially, the court's approach may be seen to foster moral hazard and encourage strategic corporate structuring. 29 Moral hazard arises from the fact that the parent obtains the financial rewards of the subsidiary's activities but is, beyond the loss of the latter's assets and any unpaid share capital, insulated from liability for the harmful consequences. This creates an incentive for it to utilise the voting rights available to it as a member to make profit maximising, yet socially undesirable decisions in respect of the subsidiary's activities. 30 There is also the motivation to structure the parent-subsidiary relationship so as to ensure that the parent is insulated from liability should the subsidiary's activities cause harm (e.g. environmental damage following an industrial accident) in the future. This would thwart the prospect of a successful claim or cost recovery by a legitimate claimant, public or private.
The provisions of the Companies Act 2006 which may be seen to confer limited liability upon a corporate member (e.g. the definition of 'member' in section 112) 31 are 26 The incorporation of a subsidiary by a parent to minimise any future exposure to financial liability arising from, for example,
an environmental accident appears to be insufficient for veil piercing doctrine to be invoked by the UK courts: Prest (n 18) 20- To be clear, the purpose of this paper is not to question the lawfulness of corporate membership but rather to inform contemporary debate as to whether the inviolability accorded by the courts to limited liability in the parent-subsidiary relationship is justifiable.
It is the central claim of this article that the Court of Appeal in Barned's and Asiatic
Banking found corporate membership to be compatible with the 1862 Act to ensure that the companies in question bore legal responsibility for shares which they held or were held on their behalf. This prevented them from disclaiming liabilities associated with the shares by contending that their very ownership was, in fact, unlawful. Whilst justice may have been achieved in both cases, the instrumental approach adopted by the courts resulted in their failure to consider the wider implications of their decisions. They neither acknowledged nor considered the fact that corporate members could, in addition to their own individual shareholders, be taken to benefit from limited liability. Nor did they recognise that they had laid the legal foundation from which corporate groups would emerge. Whilst companies' legislation, when read alongside Barned's and Asiatic Banking, would later be taken to justify limited liability being conferred upon corporate members, this was an unintended consequence of these early cases and, indeed, the 1862 Act itself. Unintended consequence is the overarching theme emerging from this article: decisions which enabled liability to be imposed upon the responsible persons would, with time, provide the jurisprudential basis for a parent company to shield itself from liability by undertaking a hazardous activity through a subsidiary.
This article is structured as follows. Section B will explain the legal factors that shaped the emergence of the right of corporate membership in the period 1850-80. Section C will evaluate the reasoning utilised in Barned's and Asiatic Banking to justify the treatment of limited companies as 'members' for the purposes of the 1862 Act. It will consider whether the conferral of limited liability to corporate members was an intended corollary of this.
Section D will examine the consideration given by the courts to whether limited liability would be conferred to corporate members. Section E will draw conclusions.
B. THE FORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
This section will explain the legal factors that shaped the emergence of the right of corporate membership in the period 1850-80. constitution, he recognised the potentially severe financial implications associated with the power. He held that purchasing shares in addition to those provided for by the Act would increase the risks to which Parliament had 'permitted the shareholders to be exposed' and involve them in liabilities to which they had never consented.
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The approach in Salomons was followed in Maunsell v Midland Great Western This included an obligation to subscribe for shares in it. Wood VC found this part of the agreement to be beyond the powers of the directors. He reasoned that it was ultra vires for a company incorporated by private Act to use corporate funds for any purpose which was not within the 'four corners' of the Act, even where it would be for its benefit. the acquisition of the shares was ultra vires. Wood VC agreed, 61 finding the directors liable to account for the funds of the company expended on the shares. He reasoned that the words 'investing in' could encompass 'buying shares for the purpose of selling them again, or for investment, or anything of that kind' but not 'buying shares for the purpose of enlarging the particular business which the company have to conduct.' 62 Rather than making a temporary investment, the directors had made a permanent investment in assisting the bank.
This was a 'totally different transaction' and so not permitted under the memorandum.
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It is clear from these early cases that the doctrine of ultra vires was applied by the courts to govern two relationships, the first being the relationship between the state and the company itself. There was a clear awareness of the potential power of companies incorporated by private Act of Parliament. The doctrine, when used alongside the states' restrictive conferral of corporate privileges, afforded a means of controlling this. 64 It allowed courts to regulate the boundaries within which statutory companies were required by their constitution to operate. Importantly, powers conferred upon a statutory company by the state were perceived as being unique to that company. 65 Indeed, the particular purposes or objects specified by the incorporators were the states' 'motive or inducement' for granting the powers in the first place. 66 They were conferred to facilitate particular and predetermined public objectives which the state, not the company, had deemed to be desirable. They could, therefore, be seen as material terms of a unique and particular 'contract' between the state and the company, 67 one deemed to have been entered upon incorporation or upon privileges being conferred by letters patent. These terms were material in the sense that they were 61 An amended claim came before James VC in Brown II (n 59). He affirmed the reasoning of Wood VC in Brown on the question of ultra vires.
62 Brown (n 59) 151 (Wood VC) (emphasis added).
63 ibid 148.
64
Rajak, 'Foundations' (n 38) 233; Rajak, 'Judicial Control' (n 53) 29.
65 Salomons (n 51) 353; 1097.
66 ibid 352-3; 1097 (Lord Langdale MR) (emphasis added). 67 Ireland, Grigg-Spall and Kelly utilise the phrase 'statutory contract' in respect of the relationship between the company and its members: Ireland, Grigg-Spall and Kelly (n 6) 160.
granted on the understanding that they would be utilised for these clearly articulated, preagreed purposes or to fulfil particular objects. Corporate funds were prohibited from being channelled to any other purpose or object, even where this would have been of financial benefit to the company. The company's departure from the stated purposes or objects could be seen as a unilateral alteration of the contract, turning it into one to which the state may not have agreed ex ante.
A statutory company's activities could have a significant impact on society. This afforded another reason for the court's firm application of ultra vires doctrine. In The East
Anglian Railways Co v The Eastern Counties Railway Co, Jervis CJ found that the safety of railway lines could be 'seriously impaired' if funds 'necessary, and destined by parliament for the maintenance of the railway' were spent on other activities, 'not contemplated when the act was obtained, and not expressly sanctioned by the legislature.' 68 There was, thus, genuine concern as to the public's safety if there was underinvestment in line maintenance, something that was a real risk if funds could be applied to invest and speculate in shares.
Corporate funds were only to be used for the purposes intended by the state.
The doctrine was also invoked to govern the relationship between the company and its members, present and future. In this manner, it was used to afford legal protection to the share as a form of tradeable property. 69 It did so in two key ways, each of which offered indirect protection to the company's investors and society more broadly. 70 First, invocation of the doctrine enabled the private rights of investors to be protected.
71
A company's profits were, unless needed for further investment in the company, seen as belonging to its members.
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A member's stake in this profit could not be distributed without their consent. by the company's constitution upon their purchase of its shares, they were not deemed to have consented to actions falling outside those authorised by the constitution. Thus, where company funds were used to acquire shares in another company when this was not authorised by the constitution it deprived members of their full stake in the profits without their consent. There was also the view that investors had a 'right' to have their money applied to the purpose or purposes specified by the incorporating Act.
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If an investor's decision to purchase a company's shares was based on its specified, published purposes then departure from them could be seen as frustrating the investor's legitimate expectations.
Again, the idea of 'contract' comes to light. 75 This time it was between the company and its members, with the purposes and objects comprising its material terms.
Secondly, and highly significantly for the purposes of this article, the courts also invoked ultra vires doctrine to render shares a safer outlet for investors. Shares could be bought and sold with ease by the experienced and inexperienced alike. In Colman and
Salomons, it was clear that Lord Langdale was acutely aware that certain financial risks went hand-in-hand with this. There was the potential for 'extraordinary losses' to be imposed upon members if the company in which the shares were held became insolvent. 76 Colman (n 39) 18; 489 (Lord Langdale MR). 77 Jefferys found that of the 3,720 companies formed between 1856 and 1865 inclusive, only 16% had shares below £5 in value and 52% had shares from £10 up to £100. Moreover, it was not until the 1880's and that the 'trend towards the small fully paid up share' was established: Jefferys (n 11) 45-46 and 54.
or no reserve' from which to meet any future call on the shares. 79 The insolvency of the company, and the subsequent call on amounts unpaid on its shares could, and often did, bankrupt its members. 80 The courts recognised that investing in shares was not a risk-free activity and could result in a member's financial ruin. But, this was a risk to which the state was deemed to have permitted members to be exposed. 81 This may be inferred quite clearly from the enactment of legislation imposing personal liability upon members.
The courts did, however, seek to reduce the prospect of additional risk being imposed upon members after the purchase of their shares, such as where directors exceeded their powers by using company funds to purchase another company's shares. For
Lord Langdale in Colman, it was in the public interest to 'defend' investors 'from all liabilities This desire to protect members from additional financial risk was seen clearly in Brown. That 'investing in' shares was viewed as an entirely different transaction to the purchase of shares so as to enlarge a business suggested that memorandums would be interpreted in a highly literal manner. However, the decision did not prohibit corporate membership, even where the shares were sought to enlarge a business. It merely required 79 ibid.
80 Harris (n 13) 358; Lipton (n 6) 461-462.
81 Salomons (n 51) 352; 1097 (Lord Langdale MR).
82 Colman (n 39) 14; 487 (Lord Langdale MR) (emphasis added).
83 Macgregor (n 55) 631-2; 238.
that the power, and any limitation of it, be set out in the memorandum with absolute clarity as to its scope if it was to be unchallengeable. With an enlarged business came the prospect of enlarged liabilities for its members. If the memorandum was vague or imprecise as to the breadth of a power, a conservative construction which prohibited the transaction certainly fitted with the manner in which the courts had approached the power since Salomons: to protect members from the financial risk over and above that intrinsic to the market for shares. Even arguments that the success of the company would be furthered through the acquisition of the shares in question would not permit the strict wording of the constitution to be overridden. 
The Decisions in Barned's and Asiatic Banking
Significantly and somewhat surprisingly given that the indirect ownership of shares by companies had long accepted by the courts by 1867, Barned's marked the first instance under English law in which the lawfulness of corporate membership was formally contested.
An incorporated company, The Contract Corporation Limited ('Contract Corporation'), sought to assist a traditional partnership to convert to a joint-stock company and agreed to apply for shares in it. This was, prima facie, permitted under Contract Corporation's constitution. Its memorandum stated that one of the company's objects was: 'To purchase or accept any...shares in any foreign or English company, and to negotiate the sale of any such securities' (emphasis added).
Contract Corporation entered into winding-up proceedings. Barned's Banking also entered into winding-up proceedings. The official liquidator of Contract Corporation appealed against an earlier decision placing Contract Corporation on the list of contributories to Barned's Banking in respect of the director's shares, the incentive being to preserve funds in the estate of the insolvent company for the benefit of its creditors.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the earlier decision holding Contract Corporation liable as a contributory. For the purposes of this article, two findings of the court are of particular relevance. Firstly, a company could be a member of another company if authorised by its memorandum and articles. 87 Whilst Cairns LJ did not proffer any reasoning in respect of this position nor provide authority for it, the decision delivered the year before in Brown did offer some support for it. 88 Though in that case, as we have seen, the phrase 'investing in' in the objects clause of the memorandum was construed strictly so as to render the acquisition of a controlling interest in another company ultra vires. Secondly, a limited company was a 'person' for the purposes of the 1862 Act and so was capable of being a 'member' of another limited company. This was, perhaps, the most significant aspect of the decision for it precluded any argument that corporate membership was, in fact, unlawful and so prohibited under the Act. Had such an argument been accepted then the constitution's authorisation of corporate membership would have been irrelevant. The share purchase would have been invalid, entitling Contract Corporation to repudiate the contract. Taken together, the power of corporate membership was now available as of right to all companies registered under the Act provided that their constitution was permissive.
In addressing the argument of counsel for the official liquidator that under the 1862
Act one company could not become a member of another company, Cairns LJ held that,
Barned's (n 9) 112. The constitution of a company incorporated under the 1862 Act comprised two documents: a memorandum of association and articles of association. Whilst the former document defined limitations on the company's powers, the latter set out its internal regulations and how they could be changed. 88 Cairns LJ, or Sir Hugh Cairns QC as he then was, was counsel for the plaintiffs in Maunsell. As we have seen in Section B, he argued successfully that the entering into of the obligation to subscribe for shares in the other company was ultra vires.
if that argument is to prevail, it must be upon the words of the Act The subscribers of the Memorandum of Association of any company under this Act shall be deemed to have agreed to become members of the company whose Memorandum they have subscribed, and upon the registration of the company shall be entered as members on the register of members hereinafter mentioned; and every other person who has agreed to become a member of a company under this Act, and whose name is entered on the register of members shall be deemed to be a member of the company. Barned's (n 9) 113 (Cairns LJ) (emphasis added).
103 ibid.
latter. These were later registered in the Royal Bank of India's name by the directors. Having resolved that corporate membership was lawful under the 1862 Act, Selwyn LJ deemed the manner in which the bank came to own shares to be entirely with the within its scope and objects and, indeed, within the scope of every ordinary banking business. 110 Two activities were, however, highlighted as ultra vires, one being specific to the bank and the other directed at banks generally. Firstly, the bank did not possess a general capacity to 'speculate' in shares by purchasing them, for example, on the Stock Exchange. 111 Secondly, no bank was authorised to 'become a partner with merchants, or shipowners, or builders, or 107 Registration of the shares, as opposed to merely taking security in respect of them, was deemed to be the appropriate course of action by the bank. It followed an opinion of an Indian court that in the latter circumstance the shares remained the borrower's property, with the bank being mere equitable mortgagees in respect of them.
to engage in transactions of that sort'. 112 They were, however, authorised to lend upon the basis of security being taken over the shares of such businesses and, if deemed necessary, register them in its name.
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Leaving consideration of the treatment of a limited company as a 'person' for the purposes of the 1862 Act until the following section, the remainder of this section will examine the use of ultra vires doctrine by the court in Barned's and Asiatic Banking. It was not the case that the doctrine played a less important role in these cases than it did in the pre-Barned's jurisprudence, it was just that its emphasis was different. It was not used to govern the relationship between the state and individual companies, a key theme of the earlier jurisprudence. A consequence of Barned's and Asiatic Banking was that incorporators of a company registered under the 1862 Act enjoyed the autonomy to determine whether it was to possess the power of corporate membership and whether any limitations were to be placed on it. This facilitated a substantial shift in power from the state to incorporators to determine how the company's relationship with other companies was to be structured. The state was no longer 'gate-keeper' to the power as it was in the case of statutory companies.
This transition chimes with a similar movement with regards the conferral of limited liability under the 1855 and 1856 Acts. 114 The decisions in Barned's and Asiatic Banking, thus, replicated the same capacity for contractual freedom in respect to the drafting of the constitution which had, traditionally, been accorded to unincorporated companies. 115 But, this was accomplished within the confines of a legal framework which resolved many of problems associated with regulating that particular form of company.
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The power of corporate membership had moved closer to being available as of right.
But, importantly, it was not a right in the true sense of the word. For the right to be available, Indeed, explicit consideration of ultra vires doctrine in the former was brief, with Cairns LJ providing no authority to evidence his assertion that corporate membership was permissible where authorised by the constitution of a company incorporated by registration.
Nevertheless, this finding meant that a company which possessed the power to take shares in another company and did in fact do so, whether directly or indirectly, could not later 116 For instance, an unincorporated company's lack of corporate personality made it very difficult for it to be sued on contracts since all the partners had to be joined on the writ: David Perrot, 'Changes in Attitude to Limited Liability -the European The court was clearly uncomfortable with the idea that the bank and, in turn, its members could benefit financially from holding shares in other companies yet deny responsibility for resulting burdens by contending that this was, in fact, ultra vires. Selwyn LJ did acknowledge that his decision to permit corporate membership would result in 'very great hardship' for the bank's members as they would be exposed to a liability attaching to a company, or indeed companies, to which they had nothing to do.
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However, this was deemed to be a risk inherent in lending money against shares, a core activity of the bank. The members had to accept both the 'benefits' and 'dangers' associated with the bank's core commercial activities.
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Where the constitution of a company (X) permitted the shares of another company (Y) to be acquired, then this would expose X's members to a greater degree of financial risk than would be the case if the right had not existed. Prior to X's acquisition of Y's shares, X's members need only have been concerned with how well X was trading. Post-acquisition, they had to monitor both companies for the insolvency of either could have financial implications for them. But, exposure of a company's members to liability to account for amounts unpaid on their shares, even if the sum was substantial, was an indirect but intended consequence of the manner in which ultra vires doctrine was applied in both cases.
Where the acquisition of Y's shares fell squarely within X's powers then X's members were required to bear financial responsibility for any amount unpaid on their shares should Y become insolvent with outstanding debts. If the prospect of the financial ruin of X's members was permitted to alter this stance then this would unfairly prejudice Y and its other members.
The potentially harsh financial consequences for investors emphasised the importance of the relationship between ultra vires doctrine and notice. In Asiatic Banking, the court made clear that the taking of security over shares, and their subsequent registration in the name of the holder, was a very different activity to investment in shares, whether active or passive. A distinction was being drawn between transactions which not only reinforced but furthered the bank's core commercial activity and those which permeated beyond this.
Activities which fell within the latter category, such as speculative investment on the Stock
Exchange, required absolute clarity in the constitution as to whether it was intended that such powers be available to the bank's directors. With clarity came effective notice. The court would only permit members to bear the financial risk associated with the types of transactions to which they were deemed to have had notice of, and thereby impliedly consented to. Whilst in Barned's, the memorandum was explicitly clear that Contract
Corporation could purchase the shares of 'any' company, foreign or domestic. A potential investor could have familiarised themselves with this publicly-available document and made an informed decision ex ante as to the prudency of acquiring shares in Contract Corporation.
Whilst harsh, the courts could not insulate a member from the consequences of their failure to do so. These would lay with the investor for they were deemed to have constructive notice of the constitution prior to their acquisition of the shares.
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It could be argued that the members of Contract Corporation and Asiatic Banking were not dealt with in the same sympathetic and paternalistic manner as those in Colman and Salomons. However, these early cases only sought to reduce the additional risk to which members were exposed through attempts by the directors to exceed the powers conferred by the constitution; the risk associated with investing in shares remained with the investor. Barned's and Asiatic Banking affirmed that company funds could only be used to acquire shares in another company if this was authorised by the constitution. Ultra vires doctrine was still readily available to aggrieved members or, in situations of insolvency, a liquidator to prevent a company's funds from being utilised in this way when the constitution did not confer this power.
Asiatic Banking is of further significance for it acknowledged a wider role for ultra vires doctrine than it had traditionally played. This was protecting those who dealt, or may deal, with a bank, a role referred to explicitly in the context of a company and its trade creditors in the later decision in Ashbury. 126 Persons who deposited their funds with a bank were one category of persons who could be considered to have dealt with it. Ultra vires doctrine offered them a degree of protection, both prior to, and after, doing so. In the case of the former, as with potential investors and trade creditors, depositors could, if they so desired, access and investigate the objects and purposes for which a given bank had been created. This enabled them to make an informed decision as to whether the risk associated with its objects or purposes rendered it a bank which should be avoided. furthered its core activity, i.e. registering shares in its own name as security for funds advanced, then the sums placed by depositors would benefit from a higher degree of protection. Asiatic Banking did, however, drive home the fact that the registration of shares as security could still entail significant financial risk for a bank and its members.
To conclude this section, in order to explain accurately the legal factors that shaped the emergence of the right of corporate membership in early UK company law, the differing yet complementary roles played by public and private ordering must be acknowledged. The importance of doing so has been emphasised in recent literature in the field of legal institutionalism. The claim made there that conceptualising law as either public or private ordering is 'mistaken' certainly holds true in the case of the lawfulness, or otherwise, of corporate membership in a given instance. 128 It is clear from the above discussion that legal institutions -the legislature and the courts -created the 'space' for the right of corporate membership to emerge by finding that a company could be a 'member' for the purposes of the 1862 Act. Equally clear, however, is the fact that it was the incorporators of companies registered under the Act who actually brought this right into existence, who filled this space.
They did so by drafting the constitution in a manner which enabled the company to hold, acquire, purchase, invest or speculate in the shares of another company if this was desired.
Members were taken to have had notice of, and consented to, the contents of a company's constitution, thus, forming something of a quasi-contract with the company when they purchased its shares. Through public ordering, the state empowered incorporators to contract for the right of corporate membership by rendering this particular form of private ordering lawful. So, the role of legal institutions in the emergence of the right and, in turn, the emergence of the corporate group, should not be downplayed. However, private ordering through the terms of the constitutional 'contract' was essential to enable a given company to take shares in another. Strictly speaking, the right was conceived by the incorporators themselves rather than conferred as such by the state. This fact has, to date, been overlooked in the literature.
C. COMPANIES AS 'MEMBERS' UNDER THE 1862 ACT
This section will analyse the reasoning in Barned's and Asiatic Banking in respect of the finding that a limited company was a 'person' for the purposes of the 1862 Act and so capable of being a 'member' of another limited company. It will consider whether the conferral of limited liability to corporate members was an intended consequence.
In many ways, the decision that a limited company could be a 'member' for the purposes of the 1862 Act may be deemed unsurprising. It may be seen as a logical and necessary consequence of the parallel decision that a company could be a member of another company if authorised by its constitution. Moreover, as we saw in section B, the practice of companies acquiring shares in other companies through the use of trustees was common throughout the 1850s and 1860s. The lawfulness of doing so had not previously been challenged by or before the courts and so the judiciary could be seen as having given their tacit approval to the practice. Therefore, it could be considered unlikely, though not inconceivable, that the courts would find corporate membership incompatible with the 1862 Act (i.e. that a company could not be a 'member' for the purposes of the Act). So, it was not a case of the courts going 'off the rails' as such in arriving at their respective decisions.
However, issue may be taken with the manner in which both courts approached the legal question at hand and the repercussions of this for contemporary company law. The argument developed in this section connects closely with that developed in the latter stages of the previous section. 130 It is submitted that the desire to ensure that Contract Corporation and The Royal Bank of India bore legal responsibility for the shares in question led both courts to approach the legal question as to whether a limited company could be a 'member'
for the purposes of Act in a somewhat instrumental manner. The facilitative approach of the courts certainly remedied the injustice that would have arisen if either company had been permitted to avoid the obligations associated with the shares as a consequence of corporate membership having been found to be unlawful. However, it resulted in their failure to consider the wider implications of allowing limited companies to be 'members' of other limited companies. This was absent entirely from the judgements. Notable omissions were, of course, the potential for limited liability to be accorded to a corporate member and capacity to create tiers of companies within an enterprise. That these issues were neither acknowledged nor considered is of immense significance for contemporary company law.
They lie at the very heart of many of the problems associated with the regulation of modern corporate groups yet were seemingly inadvertent consequences of the decisions upon which it has been presumed that their origin may be traced. Consideration of the wider implications of corporate membership would have better informed the courts assessment of the question as to whether it should, in fact, have been lawful under the Act and so capable of being within the vires of a company incorporated by registration.
Instrumentality may be inferred from two aspects of the judgements, both of which will now be considered: firstly, the analogy drawn with partnerships; and, secondly, the manner in which the 1862 Act was constructed. The points raised here also indicate that the legal arguments advanced to support the lawfulness of corporate membership under the Act were not as incontrovertible as the judgements in either decision would suggest.
A Troublesome Analogy
In an economy. Upon this view, it was not something that should be discouraged. 131 The relevant section of this reasoning is quoted in full at supra n 89 and accompanying text. company. This could have included, for example, the potential for monopolies to develop within a given industry or the prospect of one limited company gaining control of a competitor so as to harm its business. These types of issues did come to the fore in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century leading some courts there to conclude that corporate membership was contrary to public policy and unlawful. 139 In the UK jurisprudence, there appeared to be no recognition of the potential downsides to corporate membership. Anglo-Am L Rev 397, 428 citing a letter from Lord Denman to The Times, August 18, 1855. 138 The 1856 Act enabled all partnerships or associations consisting of more than six, and less than twenty members, to obtain limited liability for their members provided that certain conditions were satisfied. The application of partnership principles to the legal question at hand also masked crucial differences between corporate members and partners. This may explain why the wider implications of corporate membership were not foreseen at this formative stage.
Firstly, there were differences in the 'accessibility' of members and partners to actions by and Asiatic Banking there was nothing to prevent a corporate member from being the dominant member in the requisite group of seven or more persons and utilising this power to enforce its desires in a manner similar to a 'one man' company.
A Matter of Construction
The perceived immorality and injustice which would have followed a finding that Contract
Corporation's and Asiatic Banking's acquisition of the shares in question was unlawful appeared to influence the manner in which the 1862 Act was constructed. Cairns LJ's construction, an approach affirmed impliedly in Asiatic Banking, is indicative of instrumentality in three respects. These points also evidence the fact that it was neither intended by the originators of the Act nor foreseen by Cairns LJ in his construction of it that a limited company itself, and not just its individual members, could benefit from limited liability through its holding of shares in another limited company. another way, he began with the presumption that corporate membership would be allowed (i.e. a limited company could be a 'member' for the purposes of the 1862 Act) unless the Act stated otherwise. 154 This approach was followed by Selwyn LJ in Asiatic Banking who could not find anything in the common law or statute to 'prohibit' corporate membership. 155 Clearly, an alternative and, indeed, entirely legitimate approach given the ramifications of the decision could have been to demand that the statute explicitly permitted corporate membership before it would be allowed. This was the position adopted in the United States.
There, as late as 1888, the courts were, generally, unfavourable to corporate membership unless the state legislature had given its express authority. 156 Moreover, in the UK, certain legislation deemed by Cairns LJ to be analogous to the 1862 Act had found it necessary to cater explicitly for corporate membership. Given that the Act had amended and consolidated much of the legislation relating to companies, 157 it is surprising that it did not also do so.
The permissive approach of the court contrasts markedly with restrictive manner in which the courts constructed private Acts of Parliaments and memorandums in the preBarned's jurisprudence. There, as we have seen in cases such as Salomons, any application of company funds not 'distinctly authorised' by the incorporating Act was illegal. 158 The common theme which could be extracted from the early caselaw, from Colman to Brown, was that a private Act or memorandum would be interpreted to the letter by the courts. If it was silent, imprecise or vague as to whether a particular power could be exercised (e.g. whether the shares of another company could be acquired) it would not be permitted. This standpoint had been applied repeatedly and robustly by the courts in the Barned's. Whilst a limited company was to be treated as a 'person' for the purposes of the Act, it did not possess the general and implied right to be treated as a 'member' for the purposes of the Act; it could only be considered to be a 'member' where its constitution was permissive of its holding or acquisition of shares in the first place. So, some limited companies could be treated as 'members' whilst others could not. This distinction was, of course, not applicable in the case of natural persons.
The question as to whether a company was a 'person' for the purposes of a given legislative framework was still being grappled with some thirteen years after the decision in 
D. LIMITED LIABILITY AND CORPORATE MEMBERS
One of the most significant ramifications of Barned's and Asiatic Banking for contemporary company law arose from the subsequent interpretation of these cases. It would come to be taken that as a 'person' capable of being a member of a limited company, limited companies themselves and not just their individual members were to benefit from the limited liability conferred by companies' legislation. This was neither acknowledged nor appreciated in either case. Indeed, the issue of limited member liability was neither considered explicitly nor impliedly in the decision of either court or, indeed, in the subsequent decade.
The relationship between the corporate power to hold and acquire shares in another company and a 'contractualised' form of limited liability for corporate members was, however, considered in the 1878 decision of Re European Society Arbitration Acts. 173 This decision is important as not only was the court content to permit corporate membership but it was deemed appropriate to limit member liability for the debts of the company in which the shares were held. The case concerned the deed of settlement of an unincorporated jointstock company, British Nation Life Assurance Association ('British Nation'), registered under the 1844 Act. The deed contained a power to purchase any company of a similar nature.
Importantly, it also stated that every document under which the association became liable to pay money was required to contain a clause limiting member liability to the amount payable on their shares. British Nation resolved to purchase an unincorporated insurance company.
The shares were held by certain nominees for the association, including its officers and directors. There was then a purported transfer of these shares by deed to the association.
An order was made to wind-up the unincorporated insurance company. The liquidator contended that the association should be placed on the list of contributories to the assets of the insolvent insurance company.
In finding against the liquidator, James LJ held that the association should not be placed on the list of contributories as the purported transfer of shares to it was ultra vires and void. The deed of settlement did permit the insurance company's shares to be purchased, and so the manner in which the acquisition was structured (i.e. through nominees) was not in itself ultra vires. But, James LJ found that the association's members had never agreed to the transfer nor, in his opinion, would they have. The financial implications of doing so went entirely against the basis of limited member liability set out in its constitution. 174 The association was, however, bound to indemnify its nominees in respect of their liabilities for the shares which they held but this was limited to the extent of their unpaid capital as per the deed of settlement. 175 Thus, it may be inferred from European Society that where a corporate member, and in turn its own individual members, would be liable to an unlimited extent for the debts and obligations of the company in which the shares were held, it could alter this position through an appropriately worded clause in its deed of settlement. The court could have found this contractual form of limited liability to be unlawful but chose not to.
In essence, European Society was merely an extension of the freedom of contract philosophy adopted by the courts in response to commercial practices in the mid-nineteenth century. By 1844, it had become commonplace for unincorporated joint-stock companies in the insurance industry to insert clauses into policies limiting the liability of their members to the extent of their unpaid shares. 176 This practice was later extended to trading companies.
177
Maitland notes that whilst the courts were 'very unwilling' to concede that parties had agreed to such a clause, they 'had to admit that personal liability could be 174 ibid 706. There is the argument that early companies' legislation resolved any residual cover such claims. It was subsequently extended inadvertently to insulate memberscompanies and natural legal persons -from liability for non-contractual debts.
Whilst there was no adjudication on the broader consequences, economic, social, moral or legal, of conferring limited liability upon corporate members in the period 1850-80, the courts had highlighted and, indeed, addressed the perceived inequity and injustice in limited companies avoiding liabilities for which they were deemed to be morally responsible.
As we have seen, in both Barned's and Asiatic Banking, the moral point was certainly reflected in the reasoning of both courts. It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that the facilitative interpretation of the 1862 Act by the Court of Appeal in both cases, which enabled a legal obligation to be imposed upon the responsible entity, paved the way for one limited company to shield itself from liability by merely incorporating another limited company to carry out a risky activity. It is interesting to ponder whether a court in the formative period of 1850-1880 would have been swayed by the same moral obligation felt by Cairns LJ where there had been a deliberate attempt to structure an enterprise so as to avoid legitimate claims by tort victims. Seemingly the fate of modern non-contractual creditors was sealed by the fact that at this early stage in the development of the jurisprudence, the court was not required to ensure that, in the context of a non-contractual claim, those who were the 'real owners' of a liability were to be the persons to bear the responsibility for it. The jurisprudence may have taken a very different trajectory had such a case been heard.
E. CONCLUSION
This article sought to elucidate the historical basis in UK company law of the right for a company to be a member of another company and, through this position, benefit from limited liability. Such a study was lacking in the literature but was important for it would inform subsequent research into whether the inviolability accorded by the courts to limited liability in the parent-subsidiary relationship was justified. An original discovery was that the Court of Appeal in Barned's and Asiatic Banking found corporate membership to be compatible with the Companies Act 1862 to ensure that the companies in question bore legal responsibility for shares which they held or were held on their behalf. This prevented them from disclaiming liabilities associated with the shares by contending that their very ownership was unlawful. Whilst justice may have been achieved on the facts presented by these cases, the instrumental approach of the courts resulted in their failing to consider the wider consequences of their decisions. This was an important and original finding.
One crucial consequence overseen by the courts flowed from the authority for which these formative decisions were subsequently taken: as members of a limited company, The theme of unintended consequence may be observed from this study: decisions which permitted liability to be imposed upon the responsible persons would, with time, provide the jurisprudential basis for a parent company to shield itself from liability by undertaking a hazardous activity through a subsidiary. This capacity to create multiple layers of protection ignores the equitable dimension which underpinned the court's approach to corporate membership in both Barned's and Asiatic Banking. This fact was lost conveniently in the mists of time. Rediscovered, it could inform contemporary debate and discussion surrounding the development of appropriate legal responses to the issues raised by strategic corporate structuring.
